Human Rights and Antiterrorism: A Positive Legal Duty to Infringe Freedom From Torture? by Turner, Ian David
701xml UTER_A_720237 September 4, 2012 13:12
UTER #720237, VOL 35, ISS 11
Human Rights and Antiterrorism: A Positive Legal
Duty to Infringe Freedom from Torture?
Ian Turner
QUERY SHEET
This page lists questions we have about your paper. The numbers displayed at left can be
found in the text of the paper for reference. In addition, please review your paper as a whole
for correctness.
Q1. Au: please provide a complete mailing address.
TABLE OF CONTENTS LISTING
The table of contents for the journal will list your paper exactly as it appears below:
Human Rights and Antiterrorism: A Positive Legal Duty to Infringe Freedom from
Torture?
Ian Turner
701xml UTER_A_720237 September 4, 2012 13:12
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, 35:1–19, 2012
Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
ISSN: 1057-610X print / 1521-0731 online
DOI: 10.1080/1057610X.2012.720237
Human Rights and Antiterrorism: A Positive Legal1
Duty to Infringe Freedom from Torture?2
IAN TURNER3
Law4
The University of Central Lancashire5
Preston, UK6
In law freedom from torture and ill-treatment is “absolute,” meaning that a state cannot7
infringe the right for purposes that would seem legitimate such as the protection of8
national security. However, with the growth in international terrorism, particularly9
suicide violence, should the freedom remain without limitation? This article considers10
legitimizing torture by reference to the “positive” legal obligation the right imposes11
on states to prevent harm to individuals by third parties such as terrorists. Assuming12
such a legal argument could be made out, it is questioned whether adopting such13
measures of interrogation would in fact outweigh the negative consequences that would14
inevitably follow from reversing accepted international standards for the protection of,15
say, detainees from ill-treatment in state custody.16
It is a well-established principle of international law that those detained by the state enjoy the17
right not to be tortured and ill-treated. For example, Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of18
Human Rights (UDHR) states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or19
degrading treatment or punishment.” Furthermore, Article 7 of the International Covenant20
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states: “No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel,21
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. . .” The United Nations (UN) has also en-22
acted a treaty specifically addressing torture: the ConventionagainstTorture (UNCAT). Free-23
dom from torture and other forms of ill-treatment is legally “absolute” so there are no lim-
Q1
24
itations to the right in any circumstances. Indeed, Article 2(2) of the UNCAT states that no25
exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of war, internal po-26
litical in stability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture.27
Why in law is this freedom absolute, and non-permissable either in war or other public28
emergency? Notwithstanding the seemingly little practical value that ill-treatment might29
provide in giving state officials reliable information about, for example, a terror plot (which30
is discussed in more detail later), torture has been described as an intimate exercise of31
pain—inflicted one on one—that terrorizes and humiliates the victim, and robs them of the32
dignity and autonomy that are the essence of the ideal of being human.1 Indeed, would a33
country, bound by the rule of law, want to admit openly to its international partners that34
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2 I. Turner
it is an exponent of torture? A state in such a situation cannot allow ill-treatment without35
arguably betraying its own principles and losing credibility.236
Nevertheless, do those who engage in acts of a terrorist nature deserve the absolute37
right to be free from state harm (assuming those that died had survived), if there was a38
very real possibility that they possessed information which could avert an atrocity; and39
“intensive interrogation” was, realistically, the only conceivable means of acquiring such40
information? Perhaps the absolute nature of the antitorture right should be relaxed to41
prevent, for example, a terrorist attack—“preventative torture”3—particularly in a “ticking42
bomb”4 scenario? Remember, in the last ten years or so we have witnessed the “Ricin Case,”43
a plot to spread the deadly poison ricin on the streets of Britain in 2003;5 the “Airline Bomb44
Plot,” a plot to blow up planes flying from London to the United States with homemade45
liquids in 2006;6 and the fatal shootings in Mumbai in 2008,7 at the Fort Hood army base in46
Texas in 20098 and at Frankfurt Airport in 2011.9 Or perhaps such intensive, or “enhanced,”47
methods of interrogation should be reserved for potentially more serious acts of terror, for48
example, where the perpetrators were intent on pursuing suicide attacks, especially against49
civilian targets, such as those committed on 11 September 2001 (9/11) in New York and50
Washington in 2001,10 in Madrid in 2004,11 in London in 2005,12 and in Stockholm in51
201013? Either way, these atrocities suggest a continuation of terror threats to, for example,52
the United States and its allies. So much so, it is estimated that currently there are up to53
200 suicide bombers planning attacks in, for example, Britain.1454
Consider, also, the rights of those intent on detonating a radiological dispersion device,55
or “dirty bomb,” in a highly populated area such as England’s capital, London (I choose56
this as an example since it is arguably vulnerable to attack because of its role as the host57
city of the Olympic games in 201215)? Notwithstanding the significant human costs in58
terms of immediate loss of life and permanent injury, there would be additional traumas59
associated with the mass evacuation of hundreds and thousands of people. An evacua-60
tion, if improperly managed, would be chaotic, increasing the number of people exposed61
and the spread of contaminants. Financially, such an event would have a significant effect on62
the United Kingdom’s international standing; as well as, locally, decimating, for example,63
the property market. Environmentally, it would be a catastrophe, too; the clean up itself64
could take years.16 So should terrorists whose desire is, for example, to engage in suicide65
violence and/or acquire radiological weapons (as well as those of a chemical, biological,66
and nuclear nature) for use, particularly, against civilians enjoy a legal right like freedom67
from torture, especially since they so emphatically deny this right to their victims?68
Indeed, the former president of the United States, George W. Bush, has recently claimed69
that techniques of ill-treatment such as “waterboarding” used against terror detainees in70
U.S. custody in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba “saved [British] lives,” by averting attacks at, for71
example, Heathrow Airport and Canary Wharf in London.17 Importantly, notwithstanding72
the continuing terror threats to the United States and its allies post 9/11, as well as the73
continuing serious nature of these threats, much interest, therefore, in the effectiveness of74
ill-treating terror suspects has arguably been reignited by George W. Bush’s claims.18 This75
is especially so now that Bush’s former vice president, Dick Cheney,19 has argued that76
the use of torture at Guantanamo identified the location of the former leader of Al Qaeda,77
Osama bin Laden, in Pakistan.2078
But, noting above the weight of international law against a reversal of accepted stan-79
dards outlawing torture, is it possible for this article to present a defensible argument80
justifying some relaxation of the legal ban on the ill-treatment of terror detainees? Should81
the author, for his own credibility as an academic lawyer, who teaches a plethora of human82
rights modules across a range of undergraduate and postgraduate courses, even be doing83
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so? If he is, is he being a “securicrat,”21 a person so obsessed with fighting terrorism that84
he is prepared to sacrifice hard earned individual freedoms, disguised behind vague state85
objectives of protecting national security and preventing disorder and crime, in the cause of86
averting a terror threat? But, at the same time, the author is not a “peacenik,”22 a person who87
seemingly closes their mind to the positives of state intervention for apparent quasi-political88
ends. Ironically, it is the author who is perhaps more open minded than most because he89
is prepared to engage in a meaningful consideration of a topic such as torture that elicits90
strong—and often polarizing—views, to further a genuine discourse on an issue that many91
with arguable interests in human rights dismiss for simple reasons of ideology.2392
In an earlier article it was assessed whether, legally, freedom from torture was in93
fact without limitation.24 There some potential anomalies with the seemingly absolute94
nature of the freedom were identified. But it was found that the right was indeed legally95
absolute, notwithstanding these anomalies, thus the freedom’s qualification, for example,96
post 9/11 was not permissable. However, that article did conclude by suggesting that the97
use of ill-treatment against a terror suspect might be justified by reference to the antitorture98
right’s “positive” nature. That is, the very right of innocent civilians not to be subjected99
to harm from a terrorist atrocity may justify the use of torture against a suspect to prevent100
it. Assessing such a question is, therefore, the purpose of this article. Before, indeed,101
addressing whether the legal obligation on states to prevent torture might in fact legitimize102
the use of ill-treatment against a detainee, it is important to explain the right in more detail,103
especially its “positive” nature, which is the purpose of the next section.104
Principles of Torture and Other Forms of Ill-Treatment105
The Prohibition on Torture and Other Forms of Ill-Treatment in International Law106
It was stated above that well-established principles of international law such as Article 5107
of the UDHR and Article 7 of the ICCPR dictate that those detained by the state enjoy108
the right not to be tortured and ill-treated. The UN has also enacted a treaty specifically109
addressing torture: the UNCAT. Indeed, at regional level, for example, Article 3 of the110
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) states: “No111
one shall be subjected to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” Moreover,112
the Council of Europe—the signatory states of the ECHR—has, since 1987, opened for113
signature the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture.114
It was also stated above that in law freedom from torture and other forms of ill-treatment115
is “absolute” so there are no limitations to the right in any circumstances. Indeed, Article116
2(2) of the UNCAT states that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked117
as a justification of torture. Similarly, at regional level, Article 15(1) of the ECHR states118
that in time of war or other public emergency threatening the life of the nation any High119
Contracting Party may take measures derogating from its obligations to the extent strictly120
required by the exigencies of the situation. However, Article 15(2) permits no derogation121
from Article 3; the right is therefore categorized as “non-derogable,”122
The reach of torture and ill-treatment extends beyond international human rights law:123
depending on the circumstances torture can also engage international criminal law. Accord-124
ing to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (Geneva IV), for example, torture and other125
acts of inhuman treatment committed against protected persons during armed conflict can126
be considered crimes of war. As the Geneva Conventions of 1949 have now been ratified127
by 194 states in the world they are considered customary international law (jus cogens) so128
create an obligation on any state to prosecute the alleged perpetrators or turn them over to129
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another state for prosecution. Indeed, since 1 July 2002, 60 days after 60 States became130
parties to the “Rome Statute” through either ratification or accession, individuals can be131
tried at the International Criminal Court (ICC), at The Hague, for alleged violations of132
crimes of war such as the torture of civilians. At national level, Article 4(1) of the UNCAT133
requires that each State Party shall ensure that all acts of torture are offences under its134
criminal law. To comply with its UNCAT obligations, the U.K. government, for example,135
enacted s.134(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. This states that a person, whatever their136
nationality, commits the offense of torture if in the United Kingdom or elsewhere they137
intentionally inflict severe pain or suffering on another in the performance or purported138
performance of official duties. The effect of this legislation is that the United Kingdom,139
for domestic purposes, has “universal jurisdiction” to try any individual, whatever their140
nationality, for acts of torture committed anywhere in the world.141
Defining Torture and Other Forms of Ill-Treatment142
Article 1 of the UNCAT defines torture: “. . .[A]ny act by which severe pain or suffering,143
whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person . . . by . . . a public offi-144
cial.” Thus, torture must involve pain and suffering, physical or mental. It must be with the145
involvement of a state official, and the suffering must be severe and intentional. In Ireland146
v. United Kingdom,25 for example, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) con-147
sidered whether the so-called five techniques used against terror suspects—wall-standing,148
“hooding,” subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and deprivation of food—were torture,149
contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR. Applying their definition of torture, which was “deliber-150
ate inhuman treatment causing very serious and cruel suffering,”26 the ECtHR court ruled151
that the “five techniques” had not been torture.27152
“Torture” therefore constitutes a severe form of ill-treatment against a detainee. Modern153
techniques of torture have included rape and other forms of sexual violence; the application154
of electric shock, usually against sensitive parts of the body; the infliction of bodily injury155
and pain inducing drugs; immersion under water to the point of suffocation or other156
methods simulating drowning, such as “water boarding”; attacks by aggressive dogs; mock157
executions and beatings; and threats of violence against a person and/or members of their158
family.28 Less severe forms of ill-treatment against a detainee—for example, defecating159
and urinating on a person; exposure to bright lights; solitary confinement; “hooding”; the160
subjection to consistent high-pitched noise (“white noise”); wall-standing, often for long161
periods of time; and the deprivation of food, sleep, and sanitation—are nevertheless still162
prohibited. In Ireland the ECtHR, although ruling that the interrogative methods were not163
torture, still held that they had constituted inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of164
Article 3 of the ECHR.29165
The “Positive” Nature of Torture and Ill-Treatment166
The legal prohibition on torture, and other forms of ill-treatment, much like other “civil167
and political” rights such as the rights to liberty, privacy, and expression, is categorized as168
“negative” (i.e., a “freedom from”), meaning states simply undertake not to violate them:169
“Civil and political rights . . . are duties of restraint with individual freedom rather than170
casting positive duties on the state to act.”30 However, holding states to account for acts of171
torture is in itself insufficient in international law: states must adopt “positive” measures172
to deter acts of ill-treatment. For example, Article 2(1) of the UNCAT states: “Each State173
Party shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent174
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acts of torture. . .” Similarly, states of the ECHR must ensure that their citizens are not175
subjected to torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment, especially those by non-state176
actors. In A v. United Kingdom,31 for example, the applicant, a child, was severely beaten177
by his stepfather with a cane, who was charged with assault occasioning actual bodily178
harm (ABH) contrary to s.47 of the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (OAPA). The179
stepfather pleaded the defense of “reasonable chastisement” and was acquitted. Relying180
inter alia on Article 3 of the ECHR, the applicant complained that the United Kingdom181
had failed to protect him from the inhuman and degrading punishment committed by his182
stepfather. The ECtHR agreed, saying: “. . .Article 3 . . . requires States to take measures183
designed to ensure that individuals . . . are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading184
treatment or punishment, including such ill-treatment. . . by private individuals.”32 Thus185
international law attached great emphasis on the positive nature of the antitorture right,186
obliging states to prevent harm to its citizens, especially children, by third parties. In this187
respect, therefore, could such an important legal duty imposed on a state be constructed in188
such a way that it legitimizes the use of torture, or at least lesser forms of ill-treatment such189
as those that are merely inhuman and degrading, against third parties such as suspected190
terrorists, especially in situations where the latter were allegedly a real danger to vulnerable191
individuals such as children? Addressing this question is the aim of the next section.192
Legitimizing Torture and Ill-Treatment by Reference to a State’s “Positive”193
Duty in Law to Prevent Harm194
Questioning Torture by Reference to the “Positive” Nature of the Right195
In a previous article, largely unrelated to this study of freedom from torture, another196
“negative” human right was assessed: the right to life enshrined in, for example, Article197
2 of the ECHR. Article 2(2) of the ECHR permits the intentional deprivation of life:198
“Deprivation of life shall [contravene] this Article when it results from the use of force199
which is no more than absolutely necessary a) in defence of any person from unlawful200
violence. . .” Article 2(2)(a) therefore prohibits intentional killings by the state unless the201
force used is strictly proportionate to a legitimate aim like preventing unlawful violence.202
Article 2 not only confers this “negative” right on an individual: in law it also possesses a203
“positive” sense. According to Article 2(1), “Everyone’s right to life shall be protected by204
law.” Unlike Article 3 of the ECHR, Article 2(1) therefore expressly imposes a “positive”205
duty on the state to protect individuals from harm.206
In this right to life article the fatal shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes by firearms offi-207
cers from London’s Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) on 22 July 2005 was assessed—the208
officers had mistakenly believed that de Menezes was one of the failed suicide bombers209
from the day before. There that article concluded that the death of de Menezes was not210
unlawful.33 However, it went on to question whether in the fight against terrorism post211
9/11, particularly suicide violence, maybe there should be relaxation of Article 2(2)? That212
is, intentional killings by state agents would still need to be justified by the criterion of213
“absolute necessity” but the balance would fall more in the favor of the state, rather than214
that of the individual whose life had been deprived, reflecting the state’s “positive” duty to215
protect life under Article 2(1)?216
Previously the state’s legal obligation to protect life was recognized. This was balanced217
with a person’s right not to have their life unjustifiably infringed. Perhaps the same could be218
said with reference to Article 2(1) of the UNCAT and Article 3 of the ECHR? Yes, there is a219
prohibition on the ill-treatment of detainees, supported by an array of domestic, European,220
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and international law. And yes, the right not to be tortured is unaffected by a detainee’s221
conduct so suspected terrorists have as much right to be free from acts of ill-treatment222
as members of the general public. However, could the torture of terror suspects such as223
the 9/11 bombers (assuming they were in captivity before they had died) be justified for224
intelligence purposes? That is, to gain information from them to avert the atrocity, such as225
the numbers of the flights that were to be targeted? This would be premised by reference226
to the “positive” rights of the passengers to be free themselves from acts of harm. Such a227
contention may sit uneasily with some but the trumping of the rights of terror detainees by228
the rights of potential victims is well recognized.34 Recently, the inquest into the deaths of229
the 52 people who died in the co-ordinated 7/7 suicide attacks in London in 2005 was held.230
As per s.11(5)(ii) of Britain’s Coroner’s Act 1988 an inquest must decide how, when and231
where a deceased came by their death. It was reported that one of the victims, a 24-year-old232
finance officer at London’s Royal Society of Arts was killed as she travelled to a meeting.233
The force of the explosion propelled her through a Perspex screen in the train carriage234
thus causing her horrific head injuries. Another victim, a 34-year-old finance officer, was235
standing next to Shehzad Tanweer, one of the 7 July (7/7) bombers, when his bomb was236
detonated on a train near Aldgate station. The victim had flash and deep burns over his237
entire face and neck and the lower parts of both legs had been amputated.35 Reading the238
accounts of those who died in the 7/7 attacks, one cannot fail but sympathize with strategies239
such as the use of ill-treatment against suspects to prevent terror atrocities, perhaps justified240
on the basis of the more important right of potential victims to be free from injury.241
Constructing an Argument Justifying Torture by Reference to a Further Analysis of the242
Right’s “Positive” Nature243
Assuming that a legal argument legitimizing the torture of terror detainees could be made244
out, ironically, on a state’s “positive” duty to prevent breaches of Article 2(1) of the UNCAT245
and Article 3 of the ECHR, does the case law of the ECHR, for example, support this?246
Mowbray says: “Innovative judgments [of the ECtHR] . . . [have constructed] . . . an ever247
expanding range of [positive] obligations.”36 Domestically, the U.K. courts have arguably248
been innovative in their development of the positive nature of Article 3: Regina (Limbuela) v.249
Secretary of State for the Home Department.37 Here s.55(1) of the Nationality, Immigration250
and Asylum Act 2002 prohibited the provision of the National Asylum Support Service251
to individuals who had not made a claim for asylum as soon as reasonably practicable252
after arriving in the United Kingdom. The House of Lords had to consider the lawfulness253
of refusing three individuals governmental help. Of the three applicants, the longest delay254
in making an application for asylum was one day. Two of the claimants were forced to255
sleep outdoors and the third claimant was on the verge of doing so. All the applicants had256
suffered a deterioration in health. The court ruled that the claimants’ circumstances could257
constitute a breach of Article 3.38 In reference to Limbuela Fredman concludes: “[This258
case] provides new impetus for the developing momentum towards . . . positive obligations259
by the ECHR.”39260
Assuming a legal argument justifying a relaxation of the absolute nature of torture261
could be supported on the basis of the positive obligation to prevent harm, when would this262
duty arise? First, there is no general obligation on countries such as Britain to avert, for263
example, death: Regina (Gentle) v. Prime Minister.40 However, the positive obligation does264
oblige state authorities to deter the taking of, for example, life in broad terms. In the ECtHR265
in Osman v. United Kingdom41 it was said: “The State’s obligation . . . [means] putting266
in place effective criminal law provisions to deter the commission of offences against267
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the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and268
sanctioning of breaches of such provisions.”42269
Nevertheless, legitimizing ill-treatment by reference to a country’s positive duty to270
prevent harm, or even death, as per Articles 3 and 2(1) of the ECHR respectively, must271
surely require a greater justification than the mere assertion that the state is legally obliged272
to establish a criminal justice system, which has the net effect of reducing violence against273
its citizens? For this reason it would seem, the ECtHR in Osman did also say that particular274
circumstances must have arisen before a state would be obliged in law to act to avert, for275
example, the loss of life: “It must be established . . . that the authorities knew or ought to276
have known . . . of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified277
individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party. . .”43278
To utilize the state’s positive duty under Article 3 as a basis for maybe legitimizing279
torture, there would therefore have to be more than a general risk of harm to individuals280
from terrorism, but a specific threat to identifiable victims—and then this would have to281
constitute a real and immediate risk. Of course, if the U.K. state had in custody one of282
the alleged 7/7 suicide bombers, and intelligence came to light of the suspected plot, but283
it only suggested when the alleged perpetrators were going to act, but not the specific284
targets and/or the names of the other plotters, surely this would entail a positive duty on the285
authorities to act under Article 3? However, could this legal obligation, with the “bombs286
ticking,” arguably extend as far as infringing a suspect’s right not to be ill-treated? But is it287
not the case that a real and immediate threat of harm would have been identified? As well288
as sufficiently identifiable victims?289
Assuming, therefore, the state could justify infringing the Article 3 rights of the290
conspirators, genuinely believing that there was a real and immediate risk to, for example,291
the lives of particular London transport commuters, this would not be enough, however:292
the state must only act reasonably in averting injury. For example, the ECtHR in Osman293
also said: “[The positive] obligation must be interpreted . . . which does not impose an294
impossible or disproportionate burden on the authorities. . . . Not every claimed risk to life295
can entail for the authorities a . . . requirement to take . . . measures to prevent that risk from296
materialising.”44297
While the legal obligations imposed on the state by Article 3 of the ECHR do not298
require, in truth, the authorities to act in excess to prevent harm, could the measure of299
this duty conceivably be interpreted as condoning torture if this could be characterized300
as “reasonable,” when, for example, weighed against the thousands who died and were301
injured in the 9/11 and 7/7 atrocities, especially since ill-treatment, as a means of gaining302
information from a detainee, does work (at least on occasion—see more later)? In reference303
to the psychological duress used against republican terror suspects in Ireland v. United304
Kingdom45—wall-standing, “hooding,” subjection to noise, deprivation of sleep, and depri-305
vation of food—the ECtHR there said that it had led to the identification of 700 members of306
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the discovery of individual responsibility for about307
85 previously unexplained criminal incidents.46 More recently, it was stated above that308
the former Vice President of the United States Dick Cheney has claimed that intelligence309
collected under torture by the Americans identified the location of the former leader of Al310
Qaeda, Osama bin Laden, in Pakistan.311
Constructing a Further Argument Justifying Torture by Reference to the Right’s312
Particular Regard for the Protection of Vulnerable Individuals such as Children313
If the positive nature of the antitorture right does not legitimize the use of ill-treatment314
against a suspect for the purposes of preventing a terror attack, can it be right that those315
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who seek to destroy democracy earn the right to rely on principles that they wish to deny316
to others, especially children? When considering the nature of Article 3 of the ECHR, for317
example, the ECtHR attaches particular significance to protecting the rights of children from318
the infliction of harm. This is exemplified by Tyrer v. United Kingdom,47 where Article 3319
was violated when a 15-year-old boy in the United Kingdom’s Isle of Man was sentenced to320
corporal punishment.48 However, Article 3 of the ECHR does also attach particular weight321
to the “positive” rights of children to be free from violence committed by third parties: A322
v. United Kingdom,49 which was referred to above. Similarly, in E v. United Kingdom50 a323
failure by social services to protect four children from sexual abuse by their stepfather was324
a violation of Article 3. The ECtHR there said:325
Article 3 requires States to take measures designed to ensure that individuals326
. . . are not subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment, including327
such ill-treatment administered by private individuals. These measures should328
provide effective protection, in particular, of children and other vulnerable329
persons.51330
Adopting this reasoning, the fact that children were murdered and injured because of terror331
atrocities such as 9/11, does this justify “positive” infringements of Article 3 against terror332
suspects to reveal intelligence, otherwise attacks resulting in mass casualties would occur?333
Legitimizing Torture and Ill-Treatment by Reference to the “Positive” Duty334
in Law to Prevent Harm—A Reply335
“Positive” Rights Trump “Negative” Rights?336
Thus far, it has been questioned whether the “positive” nature of the antitorture right might337
legitimize ill-treatment to prevent harm to innocent civilians, especially children. But does338
the law justify infringements of “negative” rights by “positive” rights, especially those that339
are categorized as “absolute” (and in the case of Article 3, “non-derogable”)? In the U.K.’s340
House of Lords in Limbuela, when finding a violation of Article 3 in not providing state341
support to some asylum seekers, Lord Hope emphasized that while the “negative” right of342
an individual to be free from acts of torture committed by the state was legally absolute,343
the state’s “positive” duty to prevent harm by third parties was not: it was qualified.52344
The approach of Lord Hope in Limbuela was seemingly followed by the House of345
Lords in the later domestic case of E v. Chief Constable of Royal Ulster Constabulary.53346
Here the police were protecting catholic families walking their children to school through a347
protestant housing estate. The House of Lords ruled that the “positive” obligation imposed348
on the state to prevent a violation of Article 3—in this case the abuse suffered by the families349
at the hands of protestant bigots (rather than the harm suffered by a person for which the350
state was directly responsible) was indeed limited. The abuse was therefore “permitted,” if351
to prevent it was to impose a disproportionate burden on the authorities. The House of Lords352
believed that the action by the police—the production of a security force corridor to protect353
the families—was a proportionate measure under the circumstances; the court rejected the354
applicants’ contention that the authorities should have adopted more robust measures to355
prevent the violence, such as dispersing the “protestors” and undertaking widespread arrests.356
The effect of this ruling for the purposes of this article is significant. Earlier this article357
sought to construct a legal argument possibly justifying the use of torture by reference to a358
state’s duty to prevent harm. However, while the “negative” right of a detainee is absolute,359
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following the House of Lords in Limbuela, the “positive” right of an innocent person to be360
free harm is clearly not. Therefore, as a matter of balancing the freedoms, the negative right361
of a terror suspect, it being absolute—and non-derogable—surely outweighs the positive362
right of the ordinary individual, it being qualified?363
Constructing an Argument Justifying Torture by Reference to the Right’s “Positive”364
Nature is Surely Illegitimate?365
Earlier, in reference to the ruling of the ECtHR in Osman (which stated the same principles366
as the House of Lords in E but in reference to the obligation to protect life in Article 2(1)367
of the ECHR) it was suggested that perhaps torturing a suspect was “reasonable,” when368
compared to the threats to life and limb s/he might pose to innocent individuals. But should369
torture be viewed here in opposite terms? That is, is it not in fact an unreasonable measure370
by the state in fulfilling its legal duties under Article 3? On this issue Mowbray notes371
(in discussing in general terms the extent of the positive obligation to protect life under372
Article 2(1)): “Governments will be able to invoke . . . the avoidance of infringements of373
the Convention rights of suspects as countervailing factors when challenged as to whether374
they provided adequate protection for specific persons.”54 In this article’s fictitious scenario375
discussed above it imagined a situation where the state was actively adopting techniques376
of ill-treatment against a detainee by reference to its positive obligations to prevent harm.377
However, Mowbray suggests that this legal duty does not extend to the denial of a detainee’s378
rights—and in all likelihood would not apply to a right as so fundamental as Article 3.379
Further, in suggesting that the possible use of torture could in fact be a disproportionate380
measure (at the very least?) to prevent harm, it could also be seen as an abuse of the very381
nature of the right. For example, in Pretty v. United Kingdom55 the claimant alleged inter382
alia that s.2 of Britain’s Suicide Act 1961, outlawing assisted suicide, contravened Article383
3. Diane Pretty was suffering from a degenerative disease. At the time when she wished384
to die, she wanted her husband to assist in her suicide. By criminalizing assisted suicide,385
Diane Pretty alleged that U.K. law had consigned her to an inhuman and degrading death;386
it had a duty to prevent this. However, the ECtHR decided that because the sanctity of387
life was enshrined in Article 2 of the ECHR, Pretty’s interpretation of the positive nature388
of Article 3 went much too far. The same must surely be said about the use of Article 3389
to justify torture. This is to use it for improper purposes; purposes that were clearly not390
intended by the original drafters of human rights instruments such as the ICCPR and the391
ECHR.392
Constructing an Argument Justifying Torture by Reference to the Right’s “Positive”393
Nature is Clearly Ignoring Its Absolute Principles394
Notwithstanding the potential for abusing the nature of the right by questioning whether it395
could legitimately be used in law for preventing harm, especially on the basis of protecting396
the positive rights of, say, children, such an argument seems now to have been implicitly397
rejected in any event by the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR—the ECtHR’s highest court—in398
Gaefgen v. Germany.56 In 2002, Gaefgen kidnapped an 11-year-old boy, the son of a399
senior bank executive. He then forwarded a letter to the boy’s family, demanding one400
million Euros in return for the child’s release. Gaefgen was subsequently arrested after401
being observed picking up the ransom money. During his interrogation, Gaefgen largely402
denied any involvement in the kidnapping and provided no information about the boy’s403
whereabouts. Finally, in order to try and save the child’s life, the Frankfurt Police vice404
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president, Wolfgang Daschner, ordered that pain be inflicted on Gaefgen, without causing405
injuries, under medical supervision. Under the influence of a threat of harm, Gaefgen gave406
full details about the child’s whereabouts (although regrettably when the police found the407
boy, they discovered that he had already been killed). In response to this threat by the408
German police, the ECtHR said:409
The Court accepts the motivation for the police officers’ conduct and that they410
acted in an attempt to save a child’s life. However, it is necessary to underline411
that . . . the prohibition on ill-treatment of a person applies irrespective of the412
conduct of the victim or the motivation of the authorities. Torture, inhuman or413
degrading treatment cannot be inflicted even in circumstances where the life of414
an individual is at risk. . . . Article 3, which has been framed in unambiguous415
terms, recognises that every human being has an absolute, inalienable right not416
to be [harmed] . . . under any circumstances, even the most difficult.57417
Although only the threat of ill-treatment was made by the state in Gaefgen (which notably418
was a successful means of providing the authorities with details about the child’s captivity)419
this was still not permissible, in the ECtHR’s opinion. In situations, therefore, where lives420
can possibly be saved, especially involving those of children, freedom from ill-treatment421
is still in law without limitation, at least in terms of the right’s “negative” sense. The422
“positive” nature of Article 3 must surely be treated the same—or even less so in terms of423
state responsibilities: this element of the right being only qualified. Indeed, the degrading424
treatment suffered by the victims in E, who were in fact children walking to school, did425
not legally oblige the authorities to prevent it absolutely: they were required to act only426
proportionately, which the U.K. House of Lords, and now the ECtHR,58 have held that they427
did.428
Condoning Torture—The “Slippery Slope” Issue and Other429
Counterarguments430
Difficulties in Restricting Torture to only Those Suspected of Terrorism431
Assuming this article was able to establish that the “positive” nature of the antitorture432
right could legitimize ill-treatment by the state, the weight of evidence against engaging433
in harsh interrogation measures is seemingly overwhelming in any event. First, those434
opposed to any harm directed at a detainee argue that once it is condoned, limiting its435
degree would be very difficult.59 If psychological duress, as in Ireland, proved ineffective,436
could the state be trusted in not resorting to mild physical pain such as shaking and/or437
slapping? Or even more intense physical pain such as electric shock treatment, if the438
circumstances were so overwhelming? If this proved ineffective, what next: Threatening to439
harm a detainee’s spouse or their children? Indeed, once ill-treatment was well recognized440
in situations involving terror suspects in particular, its use would arguably spread to other441
forms of homicide and violence, especially those of a sexual nature. And maybe even to442
areas not involving suspected criminals where there would be significant long term public443
health benefits, such as, for example, the forced experimentation of HIV patients?60 To444
this end, ill-treatment would become “an entrenched, ever-widening practice, progressively445
divorced from whatever legitimate aims it might have originally served.”61 Moreover, the446
immediate—and lasting—physical and psychological harm caused to a detainee should not447
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be overlooked either: “The agony of torture typically continues to reproduce itself in the448
lives of victims and those close to them long after the physical torments stop.”62449
“Ticking Bombs”—Fact or Fiction?450
In further supporting the absolute nature of torture, does the so-called ticking bomb scenario,451
which is frequently cited as justification for the harming of a terror suspect, actually happen452
in practice? In reality, is there going to be a situation where the authorities need intelligence453
from a detainee immediately, otherwise a bomb is going to explode? Fictional television454
series such as Fox TV’s 24 and BBC TV’s Spooks frequently suggested that there was.63455
Does this type of scenario actually reflect the real life situations of counterterrorism? In the456
Channel 4 Dispatches documentary, “Is Torture a Good Idea?”, which was first broadcast457
in the United Kingdom in February 2005, Clive Stafford Smith, a British lawyer with the458
human rights charity Reprieve, asks Mike Baker, a former U.S. Central Intelligence Agency459
(CIA) officer, whether he himself has ever experienced a “ticking bomb” scenario, or at460
least knows that such an instance has occurred. To this, Baker replies: “No—not in my461
time.”64462
The Reliability of Information Gained through Torture463
If indeed there was ever such a situation in practice where a person was in custody, whom464
the authorities believed had information about a planned terrorist atrocity, would they in fact465
have sufficient intelligence such as a bomb’s location to prevent it exploding? Would this be466
known by the interrogator, with a sufficiently strong enough degree of suspicion, before ill-467
treatment was resorted to? How imminent must the terrorist attack be: seconds, minutes, an468
hour, days? Then, at what point would more aggressive methods of interrogation be pursued469
if intelligence to the torturer’s satisfaction was not forthcoming? Or at what point would it470
be accepted that in fact a detainee was not in possession of any information, or at the very471
least not in possession of any details that were directly relevant to the investigation? Even472
if some seemingly useful intelligence was revealed, at what point would it be concluded for473
practical reasons to be of little value, or even worthless? A detainee’s custody could alert474
their conspirators, who would suspect that it was only a matter of time before the authorities475
became aware of key information such as the site of a potential detonation. Indeed, this is476
assuming that any intelligence given up by a detainee during intense questioning was true.477
Again, how would an interrogator know about the reliability of the information presented?478
Time and manpower might be wasted in pursuing intelligence that was intentionally false,479
and tragically might be counterproductive if security efforts were spent averting a risk480
that, with hindsight, was never going to materialize because a bomb did detonate in either481
another location and/or at another time.482
Torture information may be false for other reasons. For example, in response to the483
recent claims by the former U.S. President George W. Bush that techniques of ill-treatment484
against terror detainees in Cuba “saved lives,” Philippe Sands QC, a noted British human485
rights lawyer countered: “Torture may produce information, but it doesn’t produce reliable486
information, as every experienced interrogator . . . repeatedly tells me. . . . It produces487
the information that the subject believes the interrogator wants to hear.”65 This allegedly488
happened to three British men, Shafiq Rault, Asif Iqbal and Rhuhel Ahmed, at Guantanamo489
Bay. After months of isolation and coercive interrogation, the men confessed to having490
been with Osama bin Laden in Afghanistan. Their three “confessions” were false, as491
British Security Service (“MI5”) officers later established the veracity of their alibis.66492
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Indeed, to those who have claimed that the torture of suspects at Guantanamo Bay recently493
revealed the whereabouts of Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, it has been alleged that in fact494
the complete opposite happened: Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who was waterboarded at495
Guantanamo 183 times, allegedly did tell interrogators about the existence of a Pakistani496
courier particularly close to the Al Qaeda leader—but this was not until after the torture497
had been suspended.67498
The reliability of torture in providing accurate information is recognized by interna-499
tional law. For example, Article 15 of the UNCAT states that any statement made as a result500
of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person501
accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made. Indeed, in the U.K. domestic502
case of A v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (No. 2)68 the House of Lords503
held that evidence procured by torture, whether of a suspect or witness, was not admissible504
against a party to proceedings in a British court, irrespective of where, by whom or on505
whose authority the torture had been inflicted. But Article 15 of the UNCAT only prohibits506
the admissibility of evidence gained through torture, so information gained through lesser507
forms of ill-treatment, that is, inhuman and degrading treatment, is maybe permitted. Nev-508
ertheless, for domestic purposes, Hughes LJ in England’s Court of Appeal in R v. Ahmed69509
did note: “In English law [evidence gained through inhuman and degrading treatment]510
would inevitably be excluded . . . on the grounds that it was obtained by oppression . . .511
under s.76 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984.”70 These issues were discussed512
at length in the case of Ahmed because the defendant, Rangzieb Ahmed, currently serving a513
life sentence in the United Kingdom, inter alia, for being a member of Al Qaeda (contrary514
to s.11 of the Terrorism Act 2000), recently won the right to appeal against his conviction.71515
Ahmed claimed that he was beaten, whipped, and deprived of sleep by Pakistani interroga-516
tors, with the complicity of MI5; he also claimed that the Pakistanis had pulled out three517
of his fingernails.72518
Does the Use of Torture actually Prevent Terrorism?519
In refuting the claims by George Bush that the use of torture at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba,520
saved lives, British Prime Minister David Cameron stressed that harming suspects was likely521
to have the opposite effect, in actually encouraging support for terrorists.73 That is, many522
young Muslim men, many of whom are already alienated by, for example, U.K. antiterror523
initiatives,74 could possibly be driven into extremism and, more seriously, violence by524
the use or threat of torture against suspects. Indeed, would such a significant reversal of525
established international standards on torture and ill-treatment be out of all proportion to the526
risk of terrorism, when in fact the annual threat of terrorism-related fatality to an individual527
in, for example, the United Kingdom was 1 in 1.1 million between 1970 and 2007?75528
Conclusion529
According to the director-general of MI5, Jonathan Evans, the main security threat to, for530
example, the United Kingdom, comes from international terror groups linked to Al Qaeda.76531
Post-9/11, such groups are intent on acquiring either chemical, biological, radiological, or532
nuclear (CBRN) weapons, particularly against civilian targets.77 Perhaps, therefore, there is533
a case for reversing international obligations outlawing the ill-treatment of terror suspects?78534
Here such an argument was addressed by reference to the “positive” nature of the antitorture535
right. That is, could the legal duty imposed on a state to protect individuals from harm,536
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especially involving attacks of a terrorist nature, legitimize a relaxation of the ban on torture537
so that an atrocity could be averted?538
In a previous article the tragic police shooting of Jean Charles de Menezes at Stockwell539
train station in London in July 2005 was analyzed. There it was questioned whether540
the express, positive duty to protect life under Article 2(1) of the ECHR justified the541
employment of a lesser standard in Article 2(2) in terrorist cases? Could the same rationale542
be applied to, for example, Article 3 of the ECHR? Although rejecting the adoption of543
court evidence gained through the ill-treatment of a detainee, the U.K.’s House of Lords in544
A (No. 2) did not prohibit the use of such information by British security services for the545
purposes of preventing an attack:546
Generally speaking . . . the executive may make use of all information it ac-547
quires: both coerced statements and whatever fruits they are found to bear. Not548
merely, indeed, is the executive entitled to make use of this information; to my549
mind it is bound to do so. It has a prime responsibility to safeguard the security550
of the state and it would be failing in its duty if it ignores whatever it may learn551
or fails to follow it up.79552
However, in constructing an argument whether the existing prohibition on the use of torture553
does allow for some kind of relaxation on the basis of a state’s positive obligation, is not554
such an interpretation, in fact, a misuse of the right (especially so when the “negative”555
sense of, say, Article 3 is absolute—and non-derogable—and its “positive” sense is not)?556
Waldron, who has recently written about balancing freedom from torture post 9/11, argues557
that while we are willing to forego some liberties for the greater good of national protection,558
there are some rights, he says, like freedom from torture, that are non-negotiable: “Some559
rights were designated long ago as absolutes precisely because of the temptation to rethink560
them or relativize them in times of panic, insecurity, and anger.”80561
In more general terms, assuming that methods of “torture lite” such as psychological562
duress were in fact permissible, would limits to these measures be observed in practice,563
especially if the pressure on the investigating authorities was particularly severe? Further-564
more, once such techniques of interrogation were widely accepted in terrorism situations,565
arguably, their use would spread to other areas of the criminal law involving violence,566
particularly where the offenses were of a sexual nature and/or children were the victims.567
Indeed, assuming legal arguments could be made out legitimizing ill-treatment by reference568
to positive obligations, which this article has, for many reasons, ultimately rejected, in cases569
such as these who is in fact the “terrorizer”? The suspect or the torturer? Finally, do those570
situations where a suspect is in custody with vital information required to avert an attack571
actually happen in practice? This may be so in the fictional TV world of 24 and Spooks,572
but not reality, it seems.573
Nevertheless, the “ticking bomb” scenario is a debate that the author of this article has574
on a regular basis with his students. Notably, many believe that in circumstances such as575
these there should be limitations to freedom from torture (assuming of course that “ticking576
bomb” scenarios do in fact exist). Addressing such issues would, of course, not have the577
existing law on their side—but morally would such courses of action be acceptable? In578
reference to the case of Gaefgen at the ECtHR, which was stated above, Greer questions579
whether the threat of ill-treatment against the child’s kidnapper was legitimate morally,580
if not legally?81 Greer premises his arguments on several grounds, one of which is the581
“positive” human right of the boy: the obvious trauma the child experienced at the hands of582
his kidnapper, and the duty imposed on the state to prevent it, compared to the lesser (my583
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italics) ten minute threat of ill-treatment experienced by the detainee. Indeed, Greer notes584
that if the boy had been held hostage, and firearms officers stormed the building where he585
was being held, shooting Gaefgen dead, the killing would have been lawful, as per Article586
2(2) of the ECHR (assuming of course that the use of lethal force by the police had been587
“absolutely necessary” for a legitimate objective such as “the prevention of crime”). So588
the authorities could have been justified in killing Gaefgen, but not infringing his Article 3589
rights if he had been arrested and questioned! Here Greer suggests, therefore, that freedom590
from torture should not be absolute, at least in moral terms. Could the same not be said591
in the context of terrorism post-9/11 where the threats to life are that far greater, because592
of, for example, the nature of the attacks and/or the indiscriminate way in which civilians593
including children are targeted? In such circumstances the rights of terror detainees would594
still be violated by the state, thus permitting suspects the opportunity of legal redress, but,595
morally, the actions of state authorities would be excused.596
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